The point of this exception is that the Privacy Act never prohibits a disclosure that the Freedom of Information Act actually requires. Apr. Cf. 97-3367, 1998 WL 230200, at *2-3 (E.D. 51 (1) Any application under section 41 or 42 relating to personal information that the head of a government institution has refused to disclose by reason of paragraph 19(1)(a) or (b) or section 21, and any application under section 43 in respect of a file contained in a personal information bank designated as an exempt bank under section 18 to contain files all of which consist predominantly of personal information described in section 21, shall be heard and determined by the Chief Justice of the Federal Court or by any other judge of the Court that the Chief Justice may designate to hear the applications. 2007); In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. 19 (1) A reference to the former agency in any of the following is deemed to be a reference to the new agency: (g) any order of the Governor in Council made under paragraph (b) of the definition head in section 3 of the Privacy Act; and. 2d 150, 156 (D.D.C. Va. July 24, 2000), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, & remanded, on other grounds sub nom. 96-1739, 1999 WL 1032814, at *3-5 (D.D.C. In other words, a particular disclosure is unauthorized if it does not fall within the clear terms of the routine use. Rather, seeing “no conflict between the purposes for which the information was collected and those for which it will be disclosed,” he found the disclosure to be compatible without further inquiry. § 552a(b). 1985) (finding subpoena is court order where it is required to be approved by judge under state law). 2d 1113, 1121 (N.D. Cal. Co., 734 F.2d 1441, 1447 (11th Cir. former agency means the portion of the federal public administration known as the Economic Development Agency of Canada for the Regions of Quebec. (ancienne agence), new agency means the Economic Development Agency of Canada for the Regions of Quebec established by section 8. (nouvelle agence). Shayesteh v. Raty, No. . (f) correspondence sent to a government institution by the individual that is implicitly or explicitly of a private or confidential nature, and replies to such correspondence that would reveal the contents of the original correspondence. 06-1302, 2006 WL 2223999, at *2-3 (D.D.C. In Laningham, the district court ruled that the government’s nonconsensual disclosure of plaintiff’s “disability evaluation” records to the United States Claims Court was improper – even though such records were filed only after the agency’s motion for leave to file “out of time” was granted. 00-3355, 2007 WL 2295402, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Ohio 2013); cf. 1:008-cv-63, 2009 U.S. Dist. . 47 In any proceedings before the Court arising from an application under section 41, 42 or 43, the burden of establishing that the head of a government institution is authorized to refuse to disclose personal information requested under subsection 12(1) or that a file should be included in a personal information bank designated as an exempt bank under section 18 shall be on the government institution concerned. (b) in the case of a file contained in the bank on the basis of personal information described in section 21 or paragraph 22(1)(b) or (c), that reasonable grounds do not exist on which to include the file in the bank. 1979) (discussing HEW’s disclosure of plaintiff’s Medicaid cost reports to Justice Department for use in criminal case against plaintiff); Reed v. Navy, 910 F.Supp.2d 32, 42-43 (D.D.C. 1984); cf. 1989); see also FLRA v. Treasury, 884 F.2d 1446, 1450 & n.2 (D.C. Cir. But see O’Donnell v. DOD, No. 262, 294, 2013, c. 14, ss. LEXIS 11536, at *6 (S.D. (3) The provisions of the Public Service Superannuation Act, other than those relating to tenure of office, apply to the Privacy Commissioner, except that a person appointed as Privacy Commissioner from outside the public service, as defined in the Public Service Superannuation Act, may, by notice in writing given to the President of the Treasury Board not more than sixty days after the date of appointment, elect to participate in the pension plan provided in the Diplomatic Service (Special) Superannuation Act, in which case the provisions of that Act, other than those relating to tenure of office, apply to the Privacy Commissioner from the date of appointment and the provisions of the Public Service Superannuation Act do not apply. (4) Any report made by the Privacy Commissioner under subsection (3) may be included in a report made pursuant to section 38 or 39. See Taylor v. Orr, No. 72 (1) Every year the head of every government institution shall prepare a report on the administration of this Act within the institution during the period beginning on April 1 of the preceding year and ending on March 31 of the current year. Va. 1976), aff’d, 573 F.2d 184 (4th Cir. Marginal note:Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. (2) A government institution shall take all reasonable steps to ensure that personal information that is used for an administrative purpose by the institution is as accurate, up-to-date and complete as possible. 2d 128, 129 (D.D.C. 2d at 318 (finding an intra-agency disclosure where a medical sample was sent to an outside laboratory because “[f]or testing purposes a private laboratory is necessarily treated as part of the agency”); Coakley v. DOT, No. Mar. But cf. Often during the course of litigation, an agency will be asked to produce Privacy Act-protected information pursuant to a discovery request by an opposing party. Cal. Marginal note:Application respecting files in exempt banks. 95-9489 (11th Cir. 10, 1999) (discussing disclosure of plaintiff’s medical records within VA so that his supervisor could document his request for medical leave and determine level of work he could perform), appeal dismissed for appellant’s failure to comply with scheduling order, No. . Corp., 990 F. Supp. 80-0952, slip op. 2007) (“The net effect of the interaction between the two statutes is that where the FOIA requires disclosure, the Privacy Act will not stand in its way, but where the FOIA would permit withholding under an exemption, the Privacy Act makes such withholding mandatory upon the agency.”); Greentree v. U.S. Customs Serv., 674 F.2d 74, 79 (D.C. Cir. See Laningham v. Navy, No. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 762-75 (1989), the Supreme Court significantly expanded the breadths of FOIA Exemptions 6 and 7(C). (3) For greater certainty, by reason of subsection 29(3) of the Ending the Long-gun Registry Act, subsections 6(1) and (3) of the Privacy Act do not apply as of April 5, 2012 with respect to personal information. “However, [it] does not provide a basis for federal jurisdiction. XIX, No. 11, 2001); Khalfani v. VA, No. Where, in the opinion of the head of the institution, the public interest in disclosure clearly outweighs any invasion of privacy that could result from the disclosure; or where the disclosure would clearly benefit the individual to whom the information relates (paragraph 8(2)(m)). § 552a(b)). May 12, 2010); Stiward v. United States, No. TH 85-310-C, slip op. Record-requesting authority may be delegated down to lower-level agency officials when necessary, but not below the “section chief” level. On the other hand, when an agency wishes to make an affirmative disclosure of information during litigation it may either rely on a routine use permitting such disclosure or seek a court order. at 2-3 (D.D.C. 1989). 612, 614 (S.D.N.Y. June 12, 1990) (“Even assuming the Privacy Act supplies a statutory privilege . Marginal note:Protection of Privacy Commissioner. The Privacy Act protects the confidentiality of individuals’ records. LEXIS 2372, at *6 (D.D.C. See NLRB v. USPS, No. 20, 2013) (finding proposed subpoena deficient on other grounds, discussing request for subpoena to be signed by a judge in accordance with subsection (b)(11)); Hoffman v. Astrue, No. § 552a(e)(3)”). See Golez v. Potter, No. 19, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/foia-memo-march2009.pdf, is inapplicable to information covered by the Privacy Act that also falls under one or more of the FOIA exemptions. On cross-appeals, a divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment on other grounds. 97-5330, 1998 WL 315583 (D.C. Cir. Mason v. S. Bend Cmty. 5. 1993). 5 U.S.C. La. at 614 (“[It] has never been suggested that the Privacy Act was intended to serve as a limiting amendment to . (b) provide the individual with a copy thereof. (b) the specific provision of this Act on which the refusal was based or the provision on which a refusal could reasonably be expected to be based if the information existed. v. United States, No. 5 U.S.C. 1996) (unpublished table decision); McNeill v. IRS, No. 2009) (discussing disclosure of information regarding employee’s mental state, collected for purpose of coordinating his reasonable accommodation request, to state unemployment commission and to contractor in order to help determine employee’s eligibility for benefits, where contractor appealed from plaintiff’s award of benefits on agency’s behalf); Lucido v. Mueller, No. at 147 n.1 (Williams, J., concurring). . LEXIS 20334, at *7-10 (D.D.C. An agency in receipt of such a request must object on the ground that the Privacy Act prohibits disclosure. Unfortunately, neither the Act’s legislative history, see 120 Cong. Marginal note:Court to take precautions against disclosing, 46 (1) In any proceedings before the Court arising from an application under section 41, 42 or 43, the Court shall take every reasonable precaution, including, when appropriate, receiving representations ex parte and conducting hearings in camera, to avoid the disclosure by the Court or any person of, (a) any information or other material that the head of a government institution would be authorized to refuse to disclose if it were requested under subsection 12(1) or contained in a record requested under the Access to Information Act; or. (k) information about an individual who is or was performing services under contract for a government institution that relates to the services performed, including the terms of the contract, the name of the individual and the opinions or views of the individual given in the course of the performance of those services, (l) information relating to any discretionary benefit of a financial nature, including the granting of a licence or permit, conferred on an individual, including the name of the individual and the exact nature of the benefit, and, (m) information about an individual who has been dead for more than twenty years; (renseignements personnels), personal information bank means a collection or grouping of personal information described in section 10; (fichier de renseignements personnels), Privacy Commissioner means the Commissioner appointed under section 53; (Commissaire à la protection de la vie privée), sensory disability means a disability that relates to sight or hearing. (déficience sensorielle). Mine Safety and Health Review Comm’n, 715 F.3d 631, 651 (7th Cir. (iii) requesting or obtaining access under subsection 12(1) to personal information. Circuit in Bartel. 1:CV-90-1072, slip op. (2) A government institution may provide services under subsection (1) to another government institution only if it enters into an agreement in writing with the other government institution in respect of those services before it provides the services. C11-04391, 2013 U.S. Dist. See, e.g., USDA v. FLRA, 876 F.2d 50, 51 (8th Cir. 2009) (discussing disclosure of plaintiff AUSA’s mental state to DOJ security personnel, who “needed . Employing especially broad language, the Third Circuit pointedly condemned the agency’s equating of “compatibility” with mere “relevance” to the recipient entity, observing that “[t]here must be a more concrete relationship or similarity, some meaningful degree of convergence, between the disclosing agency’s purpose in gathering the information and in its disclosure.”  Id. 685, 703-04 (W.D. See generally OMB Guidelines, 40 Fed. Bank v. United States, 63 Fed. Krohn v. DOJ, No. (3) Except in a prosecution of a person for an offence under section 131 of the Criminal Code (perjury) in respect of a statement made under this Act, in a prosecution for an offence under this Act or in a review before the Court under this Act or an appeal therefrom, evidence given by a person in proceedings under this Act and evidence of the existence of the proceedings is inadmissible against that person in a court or in any other proceedings. for Disease Control & Prevention, 623 F.3d 1371, 1382 n.11 (11th Cir. 487, 503 (E.D.N.Y. June 3, 1992); cf. The Court ruled that a privacy interest may exist in publicly available information – such as the criminal history records (rap sheets) there at issue – where the information is “practically obscure.”  Id. 2011) (rejecting appellant’s contention that “mere transmission of the documents to a fax machine at which unauthorized persons might have viewed the documents constitutes a prohibited disclosure”; affirming district court’s ruling that appellant “failed to establish a prohibited disclosure”; and stating:  “As the district court noted, [appellant] cites ‘no authority to suggest that the possibility that a record might be revealed to unauthorized readers by negligent or reckless transmission is sufficient to constitute a prohibited disclosure under the Act,’ . 00-1511, slip op. (b) on the request of the head of the government institution concerned, be heard and determined in the National Capital Region described in the schedule to the National Capital Act. CV-12-S-1681, 2013 WL 1767827, at *2-3 (N.D. Ala. Apr. . at 7 (C.D. the EEO counselor was performing an administrative function for which the agency was responsible, and the agency ha[d] not argued nor established that the EEO counselor was not an officer or employee of the agency for the purposes of 5 U.S.C. Tootle v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 468 So. 16, 1981) (finding subpoena is court order). 09-CV-0003, 2011 U.S. Dist. 18, 19, c. 33, ss. 1987); Pellerin v. VA, 790 F.2d 1553, 1556 (11th Cir. LEXIS 3987, at *6 n.2 (10th Cir. Apr. Aug. 9, 2007) (declining to decide “whether a court may ever order a government agency to disclose social security numbers despite the provisions of [the Social Security Act],” and refusing to order disclosure of social security numbers of class members who have not submitted claim forms pursuant to settlement agreement); Barnett v. Dillon, 890 F. Supp. Marginal note:Delegation to head of government institution. at 7-14 (D. Idaho Mar. 1998) (“adopt[ing] the Third Circuit’s reasoning [in Quinn] and hold[ing] that an agency may not defend a release of Privacy Act information simply by stating that the information is a matter of public record”); Scarborough v. Harvey, 493 F. Supp. 1:06 CV 1478, 2012 WL 398444, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 6, 2012) (finding where published routine use required agency to first be “aware of an indication of a violation or potential violation of” law and individual alleged that she had no criminal record, plaintiff “fairly alleges that defendants did not meet the ‘routine use’ exception because the disclosing agency could not have been aware of any wrongful behavior”); Cooper v. FAA, No. 1987); see also Weahkee v. Norton, 621 F.2d 1080, 1082 (10th Cir. (2) An Assistant Privacy Commissioner is entitled to be paid a salary to be fixed by the Governor in Council and such travel and living expenses incurred in the performance of duties under this Act or any other Act of Parliament as the Privacy Commissioner considers reasonable. 15, 31, 35, 75, 84, c. 45, s. 24, 1996, c. 8, ss. (b)from individuals who have been refused access to personal information requested under subsection 12(1); 1.3. Marginal note:Findings and recommendations of Privacy Commissioner, 35 (1) If, on investigating a complaint under this Act in respect of personal information, the Privacy Commissioner finds that the complaint is well-founded, the Commissioner shall provide the head of the government institution that has control of the personal information with a report containing, (a) the findings of the investigation and any recommendations that the Commissioner considers appropriate; and. (2) For greater certainty, the Canadian Race Relations Foundation and the Public Sector Pension Investment Board are parent Crown corporations for the purposes of this Act. Sussman v. Marshals Serv., 494 F.3d 1106, 1122-23 (D.C. Cir. . 2011); Benham v. Rice, No. 401, 404-06 (S.D. [9] A full list of actions that cannot be undertaken by a nominated person are set out at Optus, Personal—Mobile Account Access at 25 March 2008 and Optus, Small Business—Third Party Access at 25 March 2008. Va. 2002) (consent providing that the information on an application “may be disclosed to members of the public in order to verify the information on the application when such disclosure is not prohibited by law” was “a mere tautology:  plaintiff consented to no more than that ATF may disclose information except in cases where that disclosure is prohibited”); Doe v. Herman, No. (4) The Privacy Commissioner is deemed to be employed in the public service of Canada for the purposes of the Government Employees Compensation Act and any regulations made under section 9 of the Aeronautics Act. 19, 2013) (ordering disclosure under protective order and stating that the “government may redact documents only to remove information relating to third parties who are private individuals and who are unrelated to plaintiff and her claims (relating to her challenge of being placed on government watch lists)”). The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit significantly limited the utility of subsection (b)(2) in Bartel v. FAA, 725 F.2d 1403 (D.C. Cir. 20, 1987), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/omb/inforeg/guidance_privacy_act.pdf (discussing Bartel, in context of guidance on “call detail” programs, and referring to OMB Memorandum For The Senior Agency Officials For Information Resources Management (May 24, 1985) at 4-6 (unpublished)). Subsequently, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit cited this aspect of Covert with approval and remanded a case for determination as to whether (e)(3)(C) notice was provided, stating that “[a]lthough the statute itself does not provide, in so many terms, that an agency’s failure to provide employees with actual notice of its routine uses would prevent a disclosure from qualifying as a ‘routine use,’ that conclusion seems implicit in the structure and purpose of the Act.”  USPS v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 9 F.3d 138, 146 (D.C. Cir. . Compare Bruce v. United States, 621 F.2d 914, 916 (8th Cir. (2) The Court may disclose to the appropriate authority information relating to the commission of an offence against a law of Canada or a province by a director, an officer or an employee of a government institution if, in the Court’s opinion, there is evidence of such an offence. 1562, 1571 (N.D. Ga. 1995), aff’d per curiam, No. 00-3072, slip op. Reg. Always check the SORN for the 87-C-9982, 1988 WL 79653, at *1 (N.D. Ill. July 25, 1988) (discussing disclosure of rap sheet to local police department); Ely v. DOJ, 610 F. Supp. 481, 484-86 (E.D. 1989) (holding state court subpoena constitutes “action” against United States and thus sovereign immunity applied even though EPA was not party in suit); Sharon Lease Oil Co. v. FERC, 691 F. Supp. 942, 945-46 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (discussing disclosure to plaintiff’s lawyer), aff’d, 792 F.2d 142 (7th Cir. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 715 F.3d 631, 650 (7th Cir. § 552a(b)(11) permits disclosure of information by a court order. 1986); Burley v. DEA, 443 F. Supp. 15, 2010) (finding that even though records were maintained by a federal agency (the Veterans Administration), where plaintiff had been ordered in discovery to produce her mental health records in her emotional distress suit, there would be no improper disclosure because “the VA will disclose Plaintiff’s mental health records to her, so that she can transmit copies of them to defense counsel;  finding, thus, disclosure by the VA to an ‘unauthorized party’ is not involved”). (2) The Privacy Commissioner may disclose to the Attorney General of Canada information relating to the commission of an offence against a law of Canada or a province by a director, an officer or an employee of a government institution if, in the Commissioner’s opinion, there is evidence of such an offence. 37 (1) The Privacy Commissioner may, from time to time at the discretion of the Commissioner, carry out investigations in respect of personal information under the control of government institutions to ensure compliance with sections 4 to 8.